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Beyond direct damages, terrorism creates fear and insecurity, potentially reducing support
for democratic institutions if these are deemed inadequate to tackle the threat, and increasing
support for military governments. To investigate this possibility, we use data from Pakistan, a
country that experienced an exponential rise in terrorism since 2001. Exploiting individual level
data on democratic attitudes and district level information on terrorist attacks, we document
that persistent exposure to terrorism (and more broadly to violence) is associated to a signifi-
cantly lower support for democratic values. Results are robust to the inclusion of different sets
of controls, to sample splits based on gender, urbanization and education, and to endogeneity
considerations. Instrumenting terrorism and violence by the distance from the Pak-Afghan bor-
der and by religious fractionalization suggests that the documented correlation reflects a causal
impact. Terrorism thus threatens not only individuals, but also democratic institutions.
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1 Introduction
Protecting individual life and property is among the most important responsibilities of states, and
failure on this ground may lead to regime change. In the 21st century, an escalation of terrorism
and violent conflicts, often originating in developing countries but also with negative effects on
advanced economies, threatens citizens’ security in large parts of the world. We investigate the
institutional legacy of violent conflicts and terrorism. In particular, we enquire whether terrorism,
which typically aims at creating fear and insecurity, triggers or hinders democratic change. To
this purpose, we exploit detailed information on democratic attitudes and on terrorism incidence
in Pakistan.
Pakistan is one of the most terrorism-plagued countries in the world.1 Since its independence
in 1947, a game of hide and seek prevails between democratic and military institutions to govern
the country. Since 2008, it has an elected government, but it has oscillated between democracy and
dictatorship with an approximately decade frequency.2 To fight terrorism, both under dictatorship
and under democracy the government has relied more on the armed forces than on the police.
Our investigation is based on a micro-level survey conducted by Blair et al. (2013) on the model
of the one run by the Freedom House (Freedom House, 2011). For 6,000 respondents, we relate the
importance they attribute in 2009 to being governed by elected representatives and to the civilian
control over the military, to the incidence of terrorism in their district of residence between 2004
and 2008.
Our main finding is that persistent exposure to terrorism and violence decreases support for
democratic values. A one-standard-deviation (one S.D.) increase in terrorist events reduces indi-
vidual support for elected governments by 7-9%. Similarly, it reduces support for civilian control
over the military by 6-9%. These results are robust to different empirical specifications, such as
heterogeneous samples based on gender, urbanization and education level, as well as to the use of
alternative measures of risk exposure. They are also robust to controlling for endogeneity, which
might be an issue. On the one hand, endogeneity would reinforce our results if terrorists target
1The estimated direct costs of terrorism in Pakistan amount to US$ 102.5 billion since the turn of the century
(Economic Survey, 2013).
2The 2008 elections arrived after the Lawyer Movement, which in March 2007 protested against general Pervez
Musharraf’s dictatorship. Musharraf had unconstitutionally suspended the country’s chief of justice Iftikhar Muham-
mad Chaudhry and he later imposed the emergency law and suspended the constitution. On November 3, 2007, the
Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the state of emergency illegal and paved the way to the general elections.
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more frequently areas with higher support for democracy. On the other hand, our findings are ro-
bust to instrumenting terrorist attacks with the distance from the Pak-Afghan border (the Durand
Line) and violence with religious fractionalization.
Our investigation is related to the economic literature on political transition, which has proposed
different channels through which negative shocks might affect democracy and democratic prefer-
ences (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Bru¨ckner and Ciccone, 2011; Ramsay, 2011). For instance,
according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), bad economic conditions lower the opportunity cost
of revolt, which incentivizes the state to provide rights in equilibrium. Our approach differs from
Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2011) and Ramsay (2011) on two main grounds: first, we focus on persis-
tent exposure to terrorism rather than on transitory shocks; second, we investigate its effects on
individual attitudes and preferences rather than on aggregate behavior.
Our study is also related to Voors et al. (2012) and Bellows and Miguel (2009), who, among
others, find that individuals exposed to violence are more altruistic towards their neighbors, are
more risk seeking, have higher discount rates, and are more likely to engage in political groups,
vote in elections, attend community meetings and contribute to local social services. As it is
far from clear how these effects on civic engagement and risk and time preferences translate into
democratic attitudes, our findings can be seen in line with those of Blanco and Ruiz (2013) and
Blanco (2012), who explore the negative impact of crime victimization and insecurity on satisfaction
with democracy and on trust in institutions in Colombia and Mexico, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 expands on the related literature;
Section 3 presents the data; the identification strategy is explained in Section 4; Section 5 presents
the baseline empirical analysis; the transmission mechanism from terrorism risk to democratic
attitudes is discussed in Section 6; Instrumental Variable (IV) results are reported in Section 7;
and Section 8 concludes.
2 Terrorism, Violence and Individual Preferences
The literature on political economy discovers both optimistic and pessimistic results while exploring
the impact of civil wars, violence, conflict, organized crimes and terrorism on institutional and
democratic developments. It has tested the following hypotheses in different times and places:
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what is the democratic and institutional legacy of violence and conflict? Can perpetrators and
victims become productive citizens once violence is over? In this section, we limit our focus to
the exogenous impact (if any) of civil war, violent conflicts and terrorism on social and political
institutions including social capital, norms, democratic values and political participation.
To start with the optimistic view, psychologists analyzed that victims of civil war and violent
conflicts are resilient in general. They studied that victims of violence experience more personal
growth than distress (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004); greater collective action (Wood, 2003); greater
awareness and political participation (Bellows and Miguel, 2006, 2009) as the aftermath of a violent
trauma.
Similarly, the political economy literature shows that violent conflicts and civil wars lead to
the development of democratic institutions. For example, Cramer (2006) reports that violence can
“produce institutional changes, amendments to the rules of the game. In retrospect, many changes
that come to be seen as progressive have their origins in social conflicts that have taken a violent
turn. Herein lies a paradox of violence and war: violence destroys but is also often associated
with social creativity.” Following these arguments, Blattman (2009) argues that past abductions
of citizens by rebels in northern Uganda have led to increased political engagement of victims.
Similarly, Bellows and Miguel (2009) find a positive correlation between conflict and socio-political
behavior in Sierra Leone. In line with this literature, Bateson (2012) collects evidence from five
continents which shows that individuals who are recently victimized, participate more in politics
as compared to nonvictims. They become more engaged in political and civic life.
The optimistic view is further explored by political economists to analyze the correlation be-
tween violent conflicts and social capital. The relationship between conflict and social capital can
be bi-directional. At one hand, asymmetric violence and terror increase tension, decrease coopera-
tion, collective actions and trust (Colletta and Cullen, 2000). Studying comparative case studies,
Colletta and Cullen (2000) found that violence weaken the social fabric, and wreck the social capital
of a community, undermine interpersonal trust and collective action, divide community members,
destroy values and norms, and if not solved, can lead to more communal conflict. However, on the
other hand, individuals living under violent events are uncertain about their lives and economic
opportunities, therefore, social interactions and capital might be formed on the solidarity basis to
face a common external threat.
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In line with the optimistic results, a significant number of studies have explored that violent
conflicts and civil wars improve social capital, instead of destroying it. It is observed that few
African countries have witnessed a rapid post-war recovery which was not predicted by the Solow
growth models. Social scientists have attributed this surge in growth to a change in social capital
generated by violence itself. Analogous to this literature, Voors et al. (2012) study “that conflict
affects preferences: individuals exposed to violence display more altruistic behavior towards their
neighbors, are more risk seeking, and have higher discount rates.” Similarly, Bellows and Miguel
(2009) show that individuals who exposed to violence in Sierra Leone were more likely to participate
in political groups and social community; vote in local elections, attend community meetings and
contribute to local public goods. Also, Gilligan et al. (2010) find that individuals who were exposed
to violence and conflict during Nepal’s war are more likely to exhibit higher levels of social capital.
Nevertheless, significant number of studies have also discovered pessimistic results. They include
the 2003 World Bank report (World Bank, 2003: 32) that claims “[t]he legacy effects of civil war
are usually so adverse that they cannot reasonably be viewed as social progress....[Civil war] has
been development in reverse” (Collier and Others, 2003). Similarly, terrorism, violence, conflict and
civil wars are typically linked to the destruction of physical infrastructure and temporary drops in
income. It has been studied, for example, by Davis and Weinstein (2002), Brakman et al. (2004)
and Miguel and Roland (2011) for the economies of Japan, Germany and Vietnam, respectively.
If one agrees with the above inferences, then the rebuilding of society after violent conflicts and
terrorism may be more challenging and unlikely, and can contribute to the well known ‘conflict
trap’ (Collier, 2007).
It is a well established fact that terrorism and violent conflicts adversely affect physical capital
which drops incomes temporarily according to a simple Solow-style growth model. Nevertheless,
researchers ignore their effects on institutional development, social norms, social capital, social
organizations and preferences, while studying the income effect of a conflict. If asymmetric terrorism
and warfare destroy physical capital and also lead to the erosion of social capital, social and cultural
institutions, political and democratic processes, raise the level of impatience, then adverse level and
growth effects can eventuate. The opposite can happen if exposure to violence invites institutional
improvement including democratic processes.
Analogously, there are some studies which analyze negative associations between violent conflicts
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and electoral participation. For example, Bratton (2008) shows that violence negatively affects
electoral participation in Nigeria, and that the most significant effect on turnout is the “experience
of the threat of violence.” Similarly, Collier and Vicente (2014) argue that voter intimidation in
violent circumstances is effective in reducing voter turnout. In line with these results, Pinchotti
and Verwimp (2007) has analyzed that exposure to conflict decrease perceptions of fairness and
trust within communities in the post-war Tajikistan. Nevertheless, the literature on the correlation
and causation between asymmetric warfare and social capital is new and not matured yet.
Asymmetric warfare, like violent conflicts, terrorism and civil wars, will probably have significant
effects on both individual and community level preferences, behavior and social capital. Individual
exposure to conflict is different from the community and his level of democratic preferences are
likely to change relative to preferences within a community.
3 Data
We have utilized multiple data sources to collect information on variables of interest to us, i.e.,
(i) individuals’ opinions/preferences on democratic values; (ii) the number of terrorist incidents at
the district level; (iii) individual and district level measures of income, wealth and inequality; and
(iv) individual and district level geographic and socio-religious characteristics. Tables 1-3 provide
summary statistics of all relevant variables used in the following analysis.
3.1 The Survey
We derive individuals preferences on democratic and institutional features from a micro-level survey
conducted by Blair et al. (2013) in collaboration with the Pakistani non-governmental organiza-
tion, Socio-Economic Development Consultants (SEDCO). Blair et al. (2013) have fielded a 6,000-
households national level survey to measure individual level socio-economic, political and religious
attitudes. They used the sample framework designed by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS)
Pakistan to draw a stratified random sample of adult Pakistani men and women. Similarly, they
chose randomized sample from the four main provinces of the country: Punjab, Sindh, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan. Following the rural/urban breakdown in Pakistan’s census,
they randomly selected respondents within 500 primary sampling units (PSU): 332 in rural and 168
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in urban areas. The data is oversampled in the smaller provinces (Baluchistan and KPK) to ensure
the collection of sufficient information in these sparsely populated and less developed provinces.
Post-stratification survey weights were calculated which are derived from the last population census.
A face-to-face questionnaire was fielded by six mixed-gender teams between April 21 and May 25,
2009. Males surveyed males and females surveyed females, consistent with the Pakistan’s cultural
values and norms to facilitate the interviewees. We derive our dependent variable from this survey
which is discussed below.
3.1.1 Democratic Attitudes
It is a challenging task to measure people’s opinion on civil liberties, human rights, institutional and
democratic values in risky areas.3 However, Blair et al. (2013) tried to measure these opinions at the
individual level in Pakistan, which is under the spiral of terrorism since the 1980s. They followed
Freedom in the World (FIW) (Freedom House, 2011), that uses different institutional features
to measure the extent of liberal democratic values. Blair et al. (2013) selected six institutional
characteristics from the FIW survey while using questions to measure their support in Pakistan.
The survey focuses on the specific institutional qualities of liberal democratic values. These include:
governance by elected representatives, the freedom of assembly, free speech, civilian control over
the military, property rights and independent courts. This study considers two values of a liberal
democracy, given their importance in the democratic struggle of Pakistan. These are ‘governance
by elected representatives and civilian control over military.’ The public opinion on the above two
democratic values is represented by the following questions: i) how important is it for you to live in
a country that is governed by representatives elected by the people? and ii) the 1973 Constitution
of Pakistan says civilians should control the military. This means the military cannot take action
without orders from civilian leaders. In your opinion, how much control should civilians have over
the military.
To minimize between-subject variation due to respondent-specific beliefs about the democratic
situation, the survey focuses on the specific institutional characteristics rather than on behavioral
outcomes (i.e., perceptions about the legitimate action of the country) (Fair et al., 2013).
3Responses can be expressive in the survey data. Hillman (2010) notes that “response in a survey is a low-cost
action that allows people to obtain expressive utility from the answer that they give, without consequences for any
actions they need to undertake.”
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Since the Lawyer Movement in March, 2007, which resulted in the restoration of democracy
in Pakistan in February, 2008, democratic norms have gained currency in the Pakistani political
economy discourse. At the same time, this debate has also included the critical analysis of govern-
ment policies against continuous terrorism, which raised few questions on the deterrence level of
democracy against terrorism in Pakistan.
This study explores the relationship between exposure to terrorism and the preferences for lib-
eral democratic values, that is, ‘governance by elected representatives’ and ‘civilian control over
military.’ The former institutional characteristic is measured on a five-point scale (extremely im-
portant, very important, moderately important, slightly important and not important at all), while
the latter is measured on a different five-point scale (complete control, a lot of control, a moderate
amount of control, a little control and no control at all). Respondents were asked to select one
option from the five categories for each question. As shown in figures 1 and 2, about 50% of the
households selected the first two options for the ‘elected representatives’ and about 31% for the
‘civilian control’ values . Accordingly, we construct a dummy variable of two categories: the respon-
dents who select the first two options is equal to ‘1’ otherwise ‘0’. Table 1 shows the distribution
of preferences by respondents for the two proxies of democratic values.
Some scholars criticized the use of specific feature of democratic institutions as measure of
democratic development. In this context, Blair et al. (2013) have mentioned limitations of their
institutional measure. Similarly, Munck and Verkuilen (2002) noted the challenges in the mea-
surement and definition of ‘democratic values.’ Nevertheless, given these complexities, Blair et al.
(2013) study those institutional characteristics that are considered as the requisite parts of democ-
racy, formulated by the international organizations like Freedom House.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Democratic Preferences (2009)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Original Measure
Elected Representatives 1.90 1.01 1 5
Civilian Control over Military 3.20 1.35 1 5
Dummy Measure
Elected Representatives 0.75 0.43 0 1
Civilian Control over Military 0.31 0.46 0 1
Note: The original measure for the ‘elected representatives’ is designed
as: 1=extremely important, 2=very important, 3=moderately important,
4=slightly important and 5=not important at all. And for the ‘civilian control
over military’ is formulated as: 1-complete control, 2=a lot of control, 3=a
moderate amount of control, 4=a little control and 5=no control at all.
Dummy measure is equal to ‘1’ if individual preferences are either 1 or 2,
otherwise ‘0’ for both proxies.
Figure 1: Preferences for the Elected Representatives
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Figure 2: Preferences for the Civilian Control over Military Institution
3.2 Terrorism and Violence
The most important control variable of our study is the number of district level terrorist attacks
in Pakistan. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) defines terrorism as, “a terrorist attack which
fulfills the following three criterion: i) The incident must be intentional; ii) The incident must
entail some level of violence or threat of violence and iii) The perpetrators of the incidents must be
sub-national actors. In addition, at least two of the following three criterion must be present for an
incident to be included in the GTD: i) The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic,
religious or social goal; ii) There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey
some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims and iii) The
action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.” As mentioned in the above
definition, one of the main objectives of a terrorist organization is to coerce and intimidate a larger
audience than the immediate victims. Hence, a terrorist incidence could also affect the political
and economic attitudes and preferences of the larger audience than the immediate victims. Table
2 reports descriptive statistics of total number of terrorist events and acts of different kinds of
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violent conflicts (violence)4 between 2004-20085, while figures 3-6 visualize district level terrorist
attacks and violence over time and space, respectively. We use different kinds of violence events as
an alternative indicator of ‘exposure to risk’ and analyze its impact on the public opinion about
democratic norms. The correlation between terrorism and violence is 0.70, which can be observed
from figures 5 and 6. Although terrorism in Pakistan is not a new phenomenon, but the marginal
change in terrorist attacks is positive and increasing since 2004-2005 (see figure 3). The increasing
number of terrorism and violence since 2004-2005 demands attention to explore their impact on
individual preferences toward democratic norms.
Figure 3: Monthly Terrorist Attacks (2001-2012)
4Violence include assassination, extortion, target killings, violent political demonstrations, communal, sectarian
and ethnic clashes.
5Although, we have district level terror attacks from 2001-2012, we use terrorist attacks only from the period
2004-2008, because there has been a surge in terrorism in Pakistan since 2004. We also tested our baseline results
for the terrorist attacks from 2001-2008, however, the results do not change. These results are available on reader’s
request.
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Figure 4: Monthly Violence Incidents (2001-2011)
Figure 5: Geographic Distribution of Terrorist Attacks (2004-2008). Bigger the Circle, Higher the
Terrorist Attacks.
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Figure 6: Geographic Distribution of Violence Incidents (2004-2008). Bigger the Circle, Higher the
Violence.
Table 2: Summary Statistics of District Level Terrorist Attacks and Violence Incidents (2004-2008)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Terrorism 52.004 82.04 1 365
log(Terrorism) 2.87 1.53 0 5.90
Violence 246.87 367.20 1 1278
log(Violence) 4.61 1.41 0 7.15
Source: De Mesquita et al. (2013) and Global Terrorism
Database (2013).
3.3 Control Variables
Other control variables include demographic, socio-economic and religious characteristics. Demo-
graphic controls are rural/urban belonging, gender, age, language, education level, marital status,
population density and share of urban population. Socio-economic characteristics include nominal
income at individual and district level, profession, individual level economic opinions about relative
income overtime and space, inequality and land reforms. The additive asset index is calculated
from the possession of the following assets at individual level: television, air conditioner, street
lamps, home outdoor area, computer, cell phone, car, newspaper and internet. Socio-economic
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controls also include multiple deprivation index which is constructed from district level education,
health and housing variables. Lastly, religious controls include sect type, religious fractionalization,
recitation of the holy book, frequency of recitation and role of the Sharia law in the current legal
framework. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of other control variables.
4 Empirical Strategy
This section presents the econometric strategy to explore the effect of terrorism and violence on
support for democratic values. As discussed above, we use individual perception and preferences
about specific institutional features as a proxy for democratic values. To get the individual prefer-
ences, we rely on a micro level survey of 6,000 respondents. The number of terrorist attacks and
violent incidents are time-variant but the survey is time-invariant, which constraint us to rely only
on the cross-sectional dimension. We argue that district level terrorist attacks are exogenous to
individual level political preferences, thus, the probability of reverse causality is low.6 Similarly,
we separate samples on the basis of gender, urbanization and education level to assess heteroge-
neous responses to terrorism. Nonetheless, we include socio-economic and religious controls to our
baseline regressions in order to minimize the extent of reverse causality, measurement errors and
omitted variable biases. As a robustness test, results based on Instrumental Variable identification
strategy are reported in section 7.
Our baseline estimating probit equation is:
Pid ≡ Pr(yid = 1|X,Z) = β terrorismd + γ′ Xi + δ′ Zd + φp + i (1)
where
yid =
 1 with probability P if an individual i supports democratic values in district d,0 with probability 1-P otherwise
yid are the preferences of individual i on democratic values in 2009 in district d; terrorism is
the indicator for district level terrorist attacks as discussed above; Xi is a set of individual control
6For example, in figure 5, the terrorist attacks are random except the North-West part along the Durand Line.
However, the survey did not include respondents from that part due to security risk.
14
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Demographic, Social, Economic and Religious Controls
Variable(s) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Individual Level Demographic, Social, Economic and Religious Controls
Urban 0.34 0.47 0 1
Female 0.48 0.50 0 1
Language 2.85 1.48 1 7
Pushto Language 0.16 0.37 0 1
Age 33.50 11.35 18 88
Age Squared 1251.48 895.64 324 7744
Marital Status 0.77 0.42 0 1
Education (all categories) 4.22 2.23 1 7
Primary 0.13 0.33 0 1
Middle 0.14 0.35 0 1
Matric 0.19 0.39 0 1
Intermediate 0.13 0.33 0 1
Graduate 0.06 0.25 0 1
Professionals 0.02 0.14 0 1
Illiterate 0.33 0.47 0 1
Occupation 4.11 1.97 1 11
Nominal Income 9.64 6.85 0.10 100
Asset Index 0.43 0.19 0 1
Earn Less 0.36 0.48 0 1
Earn More 0.18 0.39 0 1
Better Financial Situation 0.30 0.46 0 1
Worse Financial situation 0.50 0.50 0 1
Land Reforms 0.40 0.49 0 1
Inequality 0.54 0.50 0 1
Sunni 0.96 0.18 0 1
Recitation of the Holy Book 0.57 0.50 0 1
Frequency of Recitation 0.20 0.40 0 1
Role of Sharia Law 0.73 0.26 0 1
District Level Demographic, Social, Economic and Religious Controls
Multiple Deprivation Index (MDI) 32.89 14.04 12.77 75.29
Population Density 2161.52 5878.87 20.64 33014
Urbanization Rate 38.28 26.29 5.3 100
Instrumental Variable(s)
Distance from the Durand Line 460.92 208.48 137.38 912.25
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) 0.50 0.17 0.25 0.92
Note: Nominal income is in rupees which is standardized by dividing on 1000; asset index is
an additive index of assets like TV, air conditioning, cell phone, car, outdoor area, etc.; earn
less and earn more are economic opinions compare to past period; better financial and worse
financial situations are economic opinions compare to neighbors. HHI is a district level index
of religious fractionalization.
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variables; Zd is a set of district level controls; φp are province-fixed effects and finally i is an error
term. The set of observable Xi and Zd comprises of demographic, religious and socio-economic
determinants of individual preferences on democracy.
5 Democratic Attitudes and Terrorism
5.1 Baseline Evidence
Regression estimates on equation (1) are reported in table 4.7 At first, we estimate the raw
correlation between the dummy measures of democratic values and the number of terrorist events,
then we progressively add the set of control variables to our baseline specification. The first two
panels of the table 4 show that the number of terrorist attacks is significantly associated to lower
support for elected governments and for civilian control over the military, respectively. Such result is
robust across specifications both in significance and in magnitude. A one S.D. increase in exposure
to terrorism significantly reduces both support for democratic governments and for civilian control
over the military by 6-8%, depending on the specification.
Our main result supports the pessimistic argument that exposure to terrorist attacks weakens
democratic values. Nonetheless, the following might be the reasons for this negative relationship.
First of all, the survey was conducted in the regime of the 2009 democratic government, which had
failed to supply public goods in sufficient quantity that could save lives and property of its citizens
or helped to reduce future risk of terrorism. The results could be a natural response from the
respondents to show their disapproval for democratic values, if the elected legislators were unable
to protect their basic human rights. Secondly, the above argument is strengthened by the preva-
lent civil-military imbalance in Pakistan’s political landscape. The military dictators were more
successful than elected legislatures to transfer power at the local level, giving elected representa-
tion more weightage in conducting affairs than relying on inefficient bureaucratic administration.
This gives an impression that democratic governments lack the will to decentralize resources and
power from central structure to the micro level.8 Hence, the lackluster administrative performance
7Regression results with the estimated coefficients of control variables are available upon request.
8The Discretionary Development Fund (DDF) allocates resources in the annual budget for the parliamentarians.
The basic purpose is to channel money from the central government directly to the electoral constituencies for local
infrastructure projects. In Pakistan, each National and Provincial Assembly member receives US$ 240,356 and 60,089,
respectively (Tshangana, 2010). If power transfers at the municipality level, the municipality representative has to
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of democratic institutions at local level further adds to the failure of service delivery and loss of
confidence in democracy by the people. Thirdly, Pakistan has a rich history of democratic struggle
which started from her inception in 1947 till the Lawyer Movement in 2007; therefore, a specific
dictator could not rule for more than a decade, giving way to mixed feelings by the populace for
both substitutable regimes (democracy vs. dictatorship).
The possible explanation for the relationship between terrorism and civilian control over the
military is that the army is often perceived as the only law enforcement agency which is effectively
engaged against domestic terrorists since 9/11.9 Therefore, people may react to terrorism by
considering an independent army the best safeguard of their lives and property.
Table 4: Terrorism and Democratic Values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preferences on Elected Representatives
Terrorism (log) -0.169*** -0.123*** -0.148*** -0.143*** -0.144*** -0.138***
[0.0117] [0.0169] [0.0225] [0.0229] [0.0235] [0.0241]
Marginal Effect -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
One S.D. Effect -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
Pseudo R-Square 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.17
Preferences on Civilian Control over Military
Terrorism (log) -0.125*** -0.203*** -0.166*** -0.151*** -0.146*** -0.143***
[0.0126] [0.0180] [0.0281] [0.0285] [0.0293] [0.0296]
Marginal Effect -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
One S.D. Effect -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
Pseudo R-Square 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.13
Province Fixed Effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls N N Y Y Y Y
Economic Controls N N N Y Y Y
Language Controls N N N N Y Y
Religious Controls N N N N N Y
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy which captures individual political attitudes for liberal democratic values.
Probit regressions predicting preferences for institutional norms (govern by elected representatives (N=5891) &
civilian control over military (N=5770)). Demographic controls include gender, marital status, rural/urban, age,
age-square and formal education level. Economic controls include nominal income, occupation, assets, multiple
deprivation index, perceptions on land reforms, inequality, future financial expectations and financial comparison
with the neighborhood. Language controls for five main languages speak across Pakistan. Religious controls include
sect type, number of prayers, recitation of the holy book, frequency of recitation and current role of the Sharia’s
law. Robust standard errors (clustered at district level) are presented in brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.10.
spend resources on the local development projects. Parliamentarians can no longer exploit these resources. Due to
the rent-seeking opportunity, democratic government does not want to transfer power at the local level (ICG, 2013).
9According to a report submitted to the Supreme Court of Pakistan by top spy agencies about the total
number of casualties caused by terrorist attacks since 9/11, the armed forces have suffered 15,681 casualties
while fighting domestic terrorists in the tribal areas since 2008, with 2009 being the deadliest year for them.
http://tribune.com.pk/story/527016/pakistani-victims-war-on-terror-toll-put-at-49000/
17
5.2 Democratic Attitudes and Violence
In this section, we use violent conflicts (violence) as an alternative indicator of exposure to risk,
which we believe, might affect the political opinion of an ordinary citizen. The intuition is that
violence may impose negative externalities at the local rather than the national level, due to mass
media coverage of terrorism than violence.
Religious, ethnic and nationalistic violence has escalated in Pakistan since 1980s, which is
continuing till to date. We assume that consistent and long-term conflicts also create negative
sanctions and externalities on the life and property of a common individual just like terrorism.
Consequently, we argue that violence can change the risk preferences of an individual towards his
expected life and property, which in turn may determine his democratic perceptions.
We measure violence as an aggregation of sectarian, ethnic and nationalistic conflicts. The
correlation between violence and terrorism is 0.70. The results obtained while using violence as
a main regressor are presented in table 5. The sign and statistical significance of the estimated
coefficients for the violence regressor are similar with the base line specifications of terrorism in
table 4. Except for specification (1), the effect of a one S.D. increase in violence on preferences for
elected legislators are about the same with those observed in table 4.
Similarly, the parameter estimates in table 5 are also consistent with our baseline estimates
when we consider the correlation between violence and civilian control over the military. Although,
estimated coefficients of violence have lower absolutes values, nevertheless, they are robust in sign
and significance.
5.3 Sensitivity Check
While exposure to terrorism is likely to affect preferences, nevertheless, current terrorism incidents
are more likely to shape democratic attitudes than the lag attacks. To capture the memory effect
of terrorist risk on political attitudes, we analyze the response of individuals to terrorist attacks
between January-May, 2009. The reason is that the survey is conducted around this time inter-
val from which we derive our proxies of democratic preferences. The regression results based on
terrorism between January-May, 2009 are reported in table 6.
The estimated parameters of current exposure to terrorism on support for elected governments
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Table 5: Violence and Democratic Values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preferences on Elected Representatives
Violence (log) 0.012 -0.135*** -0.206*** -0.204*** -0.203*** -0.181***
[0.0126] [0.0199] [0.0302] [0.0308] [0.0325] [0.0311]
Marginal Effect 0.003 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05
One S.D. Effect 0.004 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07
Pseudo R-Square 0.0001 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.17
Preferences on Civilian Control over Military
Violence (log) -0.145*** -0.159*** -0.120*** -0.101*** -0.0975*** -0.104***
[0.0149] [0.0200] [0.0294] [0.0298] [0.0306] [0.0302]
Marginal Effect -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
One S.D. Effect -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Pseudo R-Square 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12
Province Fixed Effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls N N Y Y Y Y
Economic Controls N N N Y Y Y
Language Controls N N N N Y Y
Religious Controls N N N N N Y
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy which captures individual political attitudes for liberal democratic values.
Probit regressions predicting preferences for institutional norms (govern by elected representatives (N=5891) &
civilian control over military (N=5770)). Demographic controls include gender, marital status, rural/urban, age,
age-square and formal education level. Economic controls include nominal income, occupation, assets, multiple
deprivation index, perceptions on land reforms, inequality, future financial expectations and financial comparison
with the neighborhood. Language controls for five main languages speak across Pakistan. Religious controls include
sect type, number of prayers, recitation of the holy book, frequency of recitation and current role of the Sharia’s law.
Robust standard errors (clustered at district level) are presented in brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.10.
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and civilian control over the military are negative and statistically significant in all specifications,
although the magnitude of the effect of current exposure to terrorism is lower than that of permanent
exposure. This suggests that continuous terrorist attacks over the years cause people to adjust their
attitude to the average level of terrorism per week/month. Due to the convergence of expectations to
the mean value of terrorism, recent attacks may not significantly shift political values. Nevertheless,
long-term and consistent exposure to terrorism risk alter individuals support for institutions which
perceive to effectively deter terrorism.
Table 6: Terrorism (January-May, 2009) and Democratic Values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preferences on Elected Representatives
Terrorism (log) -0.170*** -0.0856*** -0.0779*** -0.0667*** -0.0673*** -0.0599**
[0.0120] [0.0195] [0.0241] [0.0245] [0.0248] [0.0252]
Marginal Effect -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
One S.D. Effect -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Pseudo R-Square 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.17
Preferences on Civilian Control over Military
Terrorism (log) -0.0552*** -0.194*** -0.0918*** -0.0765** -0.0617** -0.0622**
[0.0125] [0.0211] [0.0300] [0.0308] [0.0313] [0.0316]
Marginal Effect -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
One S.D. Effect -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Pseudo R-Square 0.003 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
Province Fixed Effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls N N Y Y Y Y
Economic Controls N N N Y Y Y
Language Controls N N N N Y Y
Religious Controls N N N N N Y
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy which captures individual political attitudes for liberal democratic values. Probit
regressions predicting preferences for institutional norms (govern by elected representatives (N=5891) & civilian control
over military (N=5770)). Demographic controls include gender, marital status, rural/urban, age, age-square and formal
education level. Economic controls include nominal income, occupation, assets, multiple deprivation index, perceptions on
land reforms, inequality, future financial expectations and financial comparison with the neighborhood. Language controls
for five main languages speak across Pakistan. Religious controls include sect type, number of prayers, recitation of the
holy book, frequency of recitation and current role of the Sharia’s law. Robust standard errors (clustered at district level)
are presented in brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.10.
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5.4 Heterogeneous Effects
5.4.1 Male Vs. Female
In this section, we analyze the heterogeneous effects of terrorism risk on democratic attitudes, based
on gender separated samples. The basic purpose is to compare disaggregated preferences with the
aggregate estimates of table 4. Due to cultural and religious constraints on women in Pakistan,
female labor force participation is significantly lower than male. In 2009, the female participation
rate in the labor market was 24.1% as compared to 81.7% by their male counterpart (WDI, 2015).
Similar sanctions also put constraints on the electoral turnout of women.10 Hence, it can be argued
that males vis-a`-vis females are more exposed to the threat of terrorism, which may lead to a
negative political attitude towards democratic values. To test this heterogeneous effect on the basis
of gender, the regression results are given in table 7 for both democratic proxies.
Compare to the base line estimates in table 4, the gender separated sample results for males
relative to females are consistent in statistical significance and signs for both democratic proxies.
The important information that we can get from male-female heterogeneous samples in table 7 is
that the absolute value of a one S.D. effect of terrorism is significantly higher in magnitude for
males vis-a`-vis females.
5.4.2 Urban Vs. Rural
There exists significant heterogeneity between rural-urban proximity based on socio-economic and
religious characteristics across Pakistan. For example, about 65% of the total population live in
rural municipalities. Rural agriculture sector provides employment to about 43.7% of the total
labor force (Economic Survey, 2013). Similarly, 45% of the total terrorist attacks targeted districts
with 100% urbanized municipalities. It may be argued that terrorists preferred targets are urban
municipalities having higher population density and media coverage. Further, it can be argued
that urban residents are more exposed to the risk of terrorism than rural inhabitants. Thus, it is
intriguing to analyze separately their democratic attitudes amid terrorism risk.
Table 8 shows regression results based on urban-rural distribution of population. The esti-
10The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) did not disintegrate yet the electoral turnout on the basis of
gender, however, media reports during the election days show that female participation is generally lower then the
male (Freedom House, 2014).
21
Table 7: Terrorism and Democratic Values: Male Vs. Female Preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preferences on Elected Representatives
Male Sample (N=3134)
Terrorism (log) -0.175*** -0.229*** -0.310*** -0.295*** -0.307*** -0.266***
[0.0168] [0.0233] [0.0337] [0.0342] [0.0359] [0.0364]
Marginal Effect -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08
One S.D. Effect -0.08 -0.11 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.12
Pseudo R-Square 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.19
Female Sample (N=2866)
Terrorism (log) -0.162*** -0.0139 -0.022 -0.0449 -0.0428 -0.0606*
[0.0163] [0.0254] [0.0315] [0.0328] [0.0336] [0.0345]
Marginal Effect -0.05 -0.004 -0.006 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
One S.D. Effect -0.08 -0.006 -0.009 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
Pseudo R-Square 0.03 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.22
Preferences on Civilian Control over Military
Male Sample (N=3134)
Terrorism (log) -0.216*** -0.252*** -0.241*** -0.199*** -0.203*** -0.199***
[0.0186] [0.0248] [0.0405] [0.0413] [0.0442] [0.0446]
Marginal Effect -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
One S.D. Effect -0.09 -0.11 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
Pseudo R-Square 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.23
Female Sample (N=2866)
Terrorism (log) -0.0289* -0.154*** -0.0947** -0.0937** -0.0905** -0.0845**
[0.0174] [0.0262] [0.0394] [0.0403] [0.0405] [0.0407]
Marginal Effect -0.007 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
One S.D. Effect -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Pseudo R-Square 0.001 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11
Province Fixed Effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls N N Y Y Y Y
Economic Controls N N N Y Y Y
Language Controls N N N N Y Y
Religious Controls N N N N N Y
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy which captures individual political attitudes for liberal democratic values.
Probit regressions predicting preferences for institutional norms (govern by elected representatives & civilian control
over military). Demographic controls include marital status, rural/urban, age, age-square and formal education
level. Economic controls include nominal income, occupation, assets, multiple deprivation index, perceptions on
land reforms, inequality, future financial expectations and financial comparison with the neighborhood. Language
controls for five main languages speak across Pakistan. Religious controls include sect type, number of prayers,
recitation of the holy book, frequency of recitation and current role of the Sharia’s law. Robust standard errors
(clustered at district level) are presented in brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.10.
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mated regression coefficients and corresponding one S.D. effect are approximately similar between
rural-urban distribution, when we consider the first measure of liberal democratic norm (elected
representatives). Similarly, a one S.D. effect of terrorism is also analogous to the baseline regressions
coefficients given in table 4.
An important conclusion can be drawn from the rural-urban classification when we compare
democratic preferences on the ‘civilian control over military.’ One can clearly see in table 8 that
the effects of a S.D. increase in terrorism are 3-4 percentage points larger in magnitude than those
observed in the baseline table 4, when we consider urban sample. In between comparison, the
magnitude of a one S.D. change for urban sample is 8-10 percentage points larger than the rural.
A plausible explanation of significantly larger support for the military institution in urban
areas is the consistent threat of terrorism. As mentioned above, urban population is more exposed
to terrorism risk than rural residents, therefore, their preferences are relatively skewed towards
military institution than parliament to protect their life and property.
5.4.3 Low, Medium and High Education
Let us now investigate whether the effect of terrorism on democratic attitudes is heterogeneous
by education level. Literature on the relationship between education attainment and support
for democratic values has explored positive, both statistically significant and insignificant, effects.
Different studies analyzed the impact of education on civic participation, including voting behavior
and participation (Acemoglu et al., 2005a; Glaeser et al., 2007; Spilimbergo, 2009), to mention few.
Specifically, Lipset (1959) argues that “Education presumably broadens men’s outlooks, enables
them to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and
monistic doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices ...”
Table 9 presents evidence based on three different categories of education. The first category
(Edu 1) includes those observations which are either illiterate or completed primary level (five years
of education). The estimated values of terrorism variable for both proxies of democratic values are
approximately similar to our baseline regression specifications given in table 4.
The second category (Edu 2) consists of education level above primary (five years) till 10 years
of schooling. Again, the results are in line with the baseline specification in signs, significance and
magnitudes.
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Table 8: Terrorism and Democratic Values: Rural Vs. Urban Preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preferences on Elected Representatives
Urban Sample (N=2028)
Terrorism (log) -0.186*** -0.0643** -0.158*** -0.150*** -0.167*** -0.194***
[0.0206] [0.0297] [0.0540] [0.0554] [0.0593] [0.0611]
Marginal Effect -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06
One S.D. Effect -0.09 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09
Pseudo R-Square 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.19
Rural Sample (N=3972)
Terrorism (log) -0.195*** -0.158*** -0.169*** -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.152***
[0.0161] [0.0246] [0.0261] [0.0269] [0.0276] [0.0282]
Marginal Effect -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
One S.D. Effect -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
Pseudo R-Square 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.19
Preferences on Civilian Control over Military
Urban Sample (N=2028)
Terrorism (log) -0.170*** -0.222*** -0.250*** -0.233*** -0.207*** -0.198***
[0.0207] [0.0297] [0.0678] [0.0690] [0.0679] [0.0693]
Marginal Effect -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06
One S.D. Effect -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.09
Pseudo R-Square 0.03 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.22
Rural Sample (N=3972)
Terrorism (log) -0.0237 -0.0603** -0.102*** -0.0724** -0.0600* -0.0506
[0.0176] [0.0257] [0.0303] [0.0308] [0.0322] [0.0328]
Marginal Effect -0.006 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
One S.D. Effect -0.009 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Pseudo R-Square 0.001 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
Province Fixed Effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls N N Y Y Y Y
Economic Controls N N N Y Y Y
Language Controls N N N N Y Y
Religious Controls N N N N N Y
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy which captures individual political attitudes for liberal democratic values.
Probit regressions predicting preferences for institutional norms (govern by elected representatives & civilian control
over military). Demographic controls include gender, marital status, age, age-square and formal education level.
Economic controls include nominal income, occupation, assets, multiple deprivation index, perceptions on land
reforms, inequality, future financial expectations and financial comparison with the neighborhood. Language
controls for five main languages speak across Pakistan. Religious controls include sect type, number of prayers,
recitation of the holy book, frequency of recitation and current role of the Sharia’s law. Robust standard errors
(clustered at district level) are presented in brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.10.
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Finally, the third group (Edu 3) categorizes individuals whose education level is above 10 years
of schooling. Compare with the baseline regressions, the coefficients of terrorism are relatively
unstable in signs, significance and absolute values. Two possible reasons may explain this volatile
behavior of coefficients. First, the sample size of this category is low compare to the first two, which
might affect the precision of the estimates. Second, educated individuals’ democratic attitudes may
be more deeply rooted and less affected by exposure to terrorism.
Table 9: Terrorism and Democratic Values: Educational Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preferences on Elected Representatives
Five Years of Education (N= 2682)
Terrorism (log) -0.211*** -0.105*** -0.122*** -0.142*** -0.139*** -0.139***
[0.0192] [0.0284] [0.0340] [0.0355] [0.0366] [0.0370]
Six-Ten Years of Education (N= 1942)
Terrorism (log) -0.189*** -0.129*** -0.168*** -0.157*** -0.163*** -0.164***
[0.0199] [0.0290] [0.0377] [0.0384] [0.0389] [0.0397]
Above Ten Years of Education (N=1259 )
Terrorism (log) -0.0965*** -0.0710* -0.121** -0.0999* -0.094 -0.0927
[0.0233] [0.0363] [0.0586] [0.0586] [0.0606] [0.0619]
Preferences on Civilian Control over Military
Five Years of Education (N=2682)
Terrorism (log) -0.0466** -0.0918*** -0.184*** -0.173*** -0.160*** -0.158***
[0.0202] [0.0296] [0.0411] [0.0421] [0.0435] [0.0437]
Six-Ten Years of Education (N= 1942)
Terrorism (log) -0.106*** -0.202*** -0.137*** -0.124*** -0.126*** -0.128***
[0.0214] [0.0316] [0.0476] [0.0478] [0.0484] [0.0496]
Above Ten Years of Education (N=1259 )
Terrorism (log) -0.246*** -0.249*** -0.114* -0.0842 -0.105 -0.0951
[0.0263] [0.0375] [0.0692] [0.0727] [0.0733] [0.0717]
Province Fixed Effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls N N Y Y Y Y
Economic Controls N N N Y Y Y
Language Controls N N N N Y Y
Religious Controls N N N N N Y
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy which captures individual political attitudes for liberal democratic
values. Probit regressions predicting preferences for institutional norms (govern by elected representatives &
civilian control over military). Demographic controls include gender, marital status, rural/urban, age and age-
square. Economic controls include nominal income, occupation, assets, multiple deprivation index, perceptions
on land reforms, inequality, future financial expectations and financial comparison with the neighborhood.
Language controls for five main languages speak across Pakistan. Religious controls include sect type, number
of prayers, recitation of the holy book, frequency of recitation and current role of the Sharia’s law. Robust
standard errors (clustered at district level) are presented in brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.10.
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6 Terrorism, Income and Media Coverage
In this section we explore two channels through which terrorism may affect democratic attitudes.
In particular, we investigate whether the negative effect of terrorism on democratic preferences
depends on individual income and on individual access to the media.
6.1 The Income Channel
The economic literature has documented that terrorism and civil conflict impose significant eco-
nomic costs on different sectors of the economy. Terrorism and violence reduce tourism, foreign
direct investment, trade, transportation and telecommunication, etc. (Abadie and Gardeazabal,
2003; Chen and Siems, 2004; Frey et al., 2007; Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007; Sandler and Enders,
2008), to mention few. Some studies have also found a significant positive correlation between eco-
nomic development and liberal democratic norms. For instance, the positive statistical association
between higher income per capita and democracy is the cornerstone of the influential moderniza-
tion theory (Lipset, 1959). The hypothesis that higher income per capita leads countries to become
democratic is also supported by (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Huntington, 1993; Barro, 1999). On
the basis of these ideas, one might conjecture that terrorism reduces income, and that lower in-
come leads to lower support for democracy. Yet, Acemoglu et al. (2005b) finds that controlling
for country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and various
measures of democracy, so the support for the second link in the previous conjecture (from income
to democratic values) is at best weak in existing evidence. Nevertheless, it is worth exploring
whether terrorism has a differential impact on democratic attitudes at different income levels.
6.2 The Information Flow Channel
Social scientists, political economists and defense analysts argue that media exposure in its various
forms (electronic and print media, social media and communicative devices like cell phones) plays a
significant role in the promotion of terrorist activities (Nacos, 2002; Lewis, 2005; Rohner and Frey,
2007; Seib and Janbek, 2010; Hoffman, 2013, among others). For instance, Hoffman (2013) argues
that, “without the media’s coverage, the act’s impact is arguably wasted, remaining narrowly con-
fined to the immediate victim(s) of the attack, rather than reaching the wider ‘target audience’ at
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whom the terrorists’ violence is actually aimed.” Correspondingly, research revealed a significant
positive relationship between the use of media and political mobilization and information transmis-
sion, particularly during election campaigns (Berelson, 1954; Drew and Weaver, 1998; Tolbert and
McNeal, 2003; Eveland Jr et al., 2005; Dalrymple and Scheufele, 2007). For this analysis, media
exposure means that an individual has an access to at least one of the sources of information flow
including TV, radio, newspaper (print and electronic), internet (social media) and cell phone.
6.3 The Empirics
Table 10 presents democratic attitudes regressions, in which media exposure, and the interaction of
terrorism with income and media exposure, are progressively added to the specification of table 4,
column (6). Moreover, the coefficient of individual income, which was already included in baseline
estimates, is now highlighted. We find that terrorism affects support for elected governments in a
similar way for the rich and the poor, but it affects support for civilian control over the military
more strongly among the poor than among the rich. This result appears in line with the findings
obtained by splitting the sample by education level. We also find that the negative impact of
terrorism on democratic attitudes is more pronounced among individuals with media exposure
than among individuals without access to media news. This suggests that part of the effect indeed
works through information transmission over the media.
7 An Instrumental Variable Approach
7.1 Instruments
In our baseline regressions we control for several demographic, socio-economic and religious charac-
teristics at both individual and district level. In particular, we include factors that might influence
both democratic attitudes and the number of terrorist events, in order to minimize the likelihood
of spurious correlation. Similarly, we separate samples on the basis of gender, urbanization and
education level to assess heterogeneous effects. We also argue that district level terrorist attacks
are likely to be exogenous to individual level political preferences.
A potential threat to exogeneity would come from the possibility that terrorists, being democ-
racy averse, disproportionately target districts with higher liberal norms. Per se, this would lead
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Table 10: Income, Media Exposure and Democratic Values
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Preferences on Elected Representatives
Nominal Income 0.0236*** 0.0348*** 0.0239*** 0.0365***
[0.00610] [0.0118] [0.00607] [0.0119]
Media Exposure 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.438*** 0.448***
[0.0691] [0.0692] [0.126] [0.127]
Terrorism (Log) -0.148*** -0.112*** -0.104*** -0.0617
[0.0319] [0.0430] [0.0348] [0.0463]
Nominal Income*Terrorism (Log) -0.00387 -0.00434
[0.00322] [0.00321]
Media Exposure*Terrorism (Log) -0.0848** -0.0881**
[0.0357] [0.0359]
R-Square 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Preferences on Civilian Control over Military
Nominal Income 0.0204*** 0.00504 0.0217*** 0.00888
[0.00450] [0.00716] [0.00453] [0.00739]
Media Exposure 0.460*** 0.454*** 1.019*** 0.998***
[0.0618] [0.0620] [0.107] [0.108]
Terrorism (Log) -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.0931*** 0.0328
[0.0350] [0.0387] [0.0352] [0.0439]
Nominal Income*Terrorism (Log) 0.00657*** 0.00545**
[0.00242] [0.00242]
Media Exposure*Terrorism (Log) -0.229*** -0.223***
[0.0328] [0.0330]
R-Square 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Language Controls Y Y Y Y
Religious Controls Y Y Y Y
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy which captures individual political attitudes for liberal
democratic values. Probit regressions predicting preferences for institutional norms (govern by
elected representatives (N=4071) & civilian control over military (N=4035)). Demographic controls
include gender, marital status, rural/urban, age and age-square. Language controls for five main
languages speak across Pakistan. Religious controls include sect type, number of prayers, recitation
of the holy book, frequency of recitation and current role of the Sharia’s law. Robust standard errors
(clustered at district level) are presented in brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.10.
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to a positive estimated coefficient of terrorism, whereas we find it to be negative. If attacks are
partly caused by democratic values, then our findings provide a lower bound (in absolute value)
for the true effect of terrorism on democratic attitudes. At any rate, since it is possible to question
the exogeneity of terrorism, also on the grounds of omitted variables and measurement error, we
utilize an instrumental variable identification strategy.
We use distance of a district from the Durand Line as an instrument as we believe that most
of the terrorist organizations have safe havens in the impervious mountainous terrain of the Pak-
Afghan border due to high cost of state policing (Jones and Fair, 2010; Johnston and Sarbahi, 2013).
Intuitively, districts closer to the Pak-Afghan border are easy targets for terrorists as compared to
distant districts (see figure 5). The identifying assumption is that the variable of distance affects
only the distribution of terrorism, and does not have an impact on democratic preferences. If
this assumption is considered further, we can argue that distance from the Durand Line can affect
political preferences through socio-economic and religious heterogeneity across districts. However,
there are variations within a province irrespective of the distance from the Durand Line. All
the provinces and districts are governed by the same laws, have Muslim majority population and
speak different languages, irrespective of any distance variable. Yet, we still control our first stage
regression with the provincial fixed effects.
We also use religious fractionalization as an instrument when we analyze the correlation between
violent conflicts (alternative to terrorist attacks) and support for democratic values. There exists
a large number of religious Muslim sects and subsects in Pakistan, due to different interpretations
of the Sharia. It is argued that in districts with more religious fractionalization, there is a higher
probability of religious and communal conflict (Esteban and Ray, 2008, 2011; Esteban and Mayoral,
2011; Esteban et al., 2012). Similarly, this instrument can be excluded from the second stage
regression, since different interpretations of the Sharia law do not explicitly discuss modern political
and democratic processes. Hence, we believe that sect affiliation does not directly affect political
and democratic preferences other than through violent conflicts. We construct the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of religious concentration based on district level different religious sects
and subsects within Islam. The summary statistics of HHI is given in table 3.
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7.2 IV Regression Results
Table 11 reports IV regression results, using the same specifications of table 4 for included controls.
The first stage regression provides evidence of a statistically significant negative association between
distance from the Durand Line and frequency of terrorist attacks. The second stage coefficient of
terrorism is similar in sign and significance, except in specification (1), to the one found in our
baseline regressions, although it now tends to be higher in magnitude than in table 4. A one S.D.
change in terrorist attacks decreases support for elected governments by 5-11%, and raises support
for the military by 8-11%.
A similar IV exercise is repeated to analyze the impact of aggregate violent conflicts on demo-
cratic attitudes, and the results are presented in table 12. The first stage regression validates
religious fractionalization as a major determinant of violence in Pakistan. The estimated coef-
ficient of violence in the second stage has the same sign, magnitude and significance as in the
baseline regressions in table 5. A one S.D. increase in the aggregate violence lowers support for
elected governments by 4-11%, and raises support for the military by 6-7%.
8 Conclusion
Terrorism and violence produce not only direct damages, but also a modification of individual
attitudes in a number of domains, including risk, altruism and impatience (Voors et al., 2012). In
this paper, we investigate the institutional legacy of persistent exposure to terrorism by studying
its impact on individual attitudes towards democracy. We exploit information on political attitudes
from a micro survey conducted on 6,000 respondents in Pakistan in 2009, together with district
level information on exposure to terrorism between 2004 and 2008. We find that, controlling for a
number of individual and district characteristics, persistent exposure to terrorism is associated to
a significantly lower support for democratic values. A one-standard-deviation increase in terrorist
attacks in a district is associated to an individual support for elected legislators that is lower
by 7-9% (depending on the specification). Very similar results hold for district level exposure to
violence (more broadly defined) and for individual support for civilian control over the military.
These results are robust to the inclusion of different sets of control variables, as well as to different
sample splits based on gender, urbanization and education level. This attenuates omitted variable
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Table 11: Terrorism and Democratic Values: IV Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Stage Instrument
Distance from the Durand Line (log) -0.531*** -0.373*** -0.318*** -0.316*** -0.400*** -0.419***
[0.0433] [0.0670] [0.0659] [0.0649] [0.0585] [0.0579]
Wald test (p-value) 0.0001 0.741 0.071 0.111 0.011 0.003
F test 37.68 30.99 23.62 23.99 47.30 51.48
Preferences on Elected Representatives
Terrorism (log) 0.00831 -0.118*** -0.207*** -0.196*** -0.229*** -0.238***
[0.0174] [0.0215] [0.0382] [0.0393] [0.0396] [0.0406]
Marginal Effect 0.003 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
One S.D. Effect 0.005 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.09
Preferences on Civilian Control over Military
Terrorism (log) -0.233*** -0.247*** -0.260*** -0.238*** -0.196*** -0.211***
[0.0181] [0.0209] [0.0442] [0.0448] [0.0446] [0.0448]
Marginal Effect -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
One S.D. Effect -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy which captures individual political attitudes for liberal democratic values. IVProbit regressions
predicting preferences for institutional norms (govern by elected representatives (N=5891) & civilian control over military (N=5770)).
Demographic controls include gender, marital status, rural/urban, age, age-square and formal education level. Economic controls
include nominal income, occupation, assets, multiple deprivation index, perceptions on land reforms, inequality, future financial
expectations and financial comparison with the neighborhood. Language controls for five main languages speak across Pakistan.
Religious controls include sect type, number of prayers, recitation of the holy book, frequency of recitation and current role of the
Sharia’s law. Robust standard errors (clustered at district level) are presented in brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.10.
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Table 12: Violence and Democratic Values: IV Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Stage Instrument
HHI of Religious Fractionalization 0.363*** 0.902*** 0.809*** 0.702*** 0.291*** 0.280***
[0.0471] [0.0711] [0.0726] [0.0733] [0.0706] [0.0704]
Wald test (p-value) 0.26 0.16 0.66 0.76 0.09 0.02
F test 59.06 158.77 125.14 91.69 18.30 16.62
Preferences on Elected Representatives
Violence (log) 0.0212 -0.116*** -0.223*** -0.216*** -0.274*** -0.278***
[0.0154] [0.0216] [0.0449] [0.0467] [0.0487] [0.0505]
Marginal Effect 0.007 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08
One S.D. Effect 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11 -0.11
Preferences on Civilian Control over Military
Violence (log) -0.224*** -0.231*** -0.255*** -0.237*** -0.245*** -0.270***
[0.0141] [0.0205] [0.0502] [0.0521] [0.0534] [0.0539]
Marginal Effect -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07
One S.D. Effect -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy which captures individual political attitudes for liberal democratic values. IVProbit
regressions predicting preferences for institutional norms (govern by elected representatives (N=5891) & civilian control over
military (N=5770)). Demographic controls include gender, marital status, rural/urban, age, age-square and formal education
level. Economic controls include nominal income, occupation, assets, multiple deprivation index, perceptions on land reforms,
inequality, future financial expectations and financial comparison with the neighborhood. Language controls for five main
languages speak across Pakistan. Religious controls include sect type, number of prayers, recitation of the holy book, frequency
of recitation and current role of the Sharia’s law. Robust standard errors (clustered at district level) are presented in brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.10.
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concerns.
We further argue that the correlation we document is likely to reflect a causal impact of terrorism
exposure on political preferences. First, our measure of exposure to terrorism is predetermined
relative to the measure of political attitudes. This attenuates endogeneity concerns, but per se it
is not enough to rule out reverse causation, which might drive the results if political preferences
are persistent and affect the choice of terrorists’ targets. Yet, if terrorists attack more frequently
more democratically oriented districts, for instance with the aim of undermining democratic systems
whose outcomes they do not like, one should expect a positive correlation, so that our results would
be reinforced. More troublesome for the causal interpretation of our findings would be the possibility
that terrorists preferentially target less democratic districts. To deal with this possibility, as well as
with other possible sources of endogeneity, we consider an instrumental variable strategy based on
instrumenting terrorism and violence by the distance from the Pak-Afghan border and by religious
fractionalization. Such analysis confirms our baseline results, suggesting that persistent exposure to
terrorism and violence reduces support for democracy and thus has a negative institutional legacy
in terms of a country’s chances to keep a democratic system. To the extent that results from
Pakistan can be applied to non-democratic countries threatened by terrorism, one might conclude
that exposure to terrorism also reduces the chances of a transition to democracy.
In the words of Voors et al. (2012), “while exposure to violence encourages risk-taking and
increases the weight people attach to their fellow community members’ welfare, arguably positive
features for development (at least within certain bounds), it also seems to trigger impatience.” Our
contribution highlights the institutional legacy of persistent exposure to terrorism and violence by
showing that they decrease support for democratic institutions. An interesting avenue of future
research is to investigate how these different effects interact with one another and shape a country’s
economic and institutional response to terrorism.
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